An algebraic detection approach for control systems under multiple stochastic cyber-attacks by Li, Yumei et al.
258 IEEE/CAA JOURNAL OF AUTOMATICA SINICA, VOL. 2, NO. 3, JULY 2015
An Algebraic Detection Approach for Control
Systems under Multiple Stochastic Cyber-attacks
Yumei Li, Holger Voos, Mohamed Darouach, and Changchun Hua
Abstract—In order to compromise a target control system
successfully, hackers possibly attempt to launch multiple cyber-
attacks aiming at multiple communication channels of the control
system. However, the problem of detecting multiple cyber-attacks
has been hardly investigated so far. Therefore, this paper deals
with the detection of multiple stochastic cyber-attacks aiming at
multiple communication channels of a control system. Our goal is
to design a detector for the control system under multiple cyber-
attacks. Based on frequency-domain transformation technique
and auxiliary detection tools, an algebraic detection approach
is proposed. By applying the presented approach, residual in-
formation caused by different attacks is obtained respectively
and anomalies in the control system are detected. Sufficient
and necessary conditions guaranteeing the detectability of the
multiple stochastic cyber-attacks are obtained. The presented
detection approach is simple and straightforward. Finally, two
simulation examples are provided, and the simulation results
show that the detection approach is effective and feasible.
Index Terms—Cyber-attack detection, control system, multiple
stochastic cyber-attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
AS networks become ubiquitous and more and moreindustrial control systems are connected to open pub-
lic networks, control systems are increased the risk of ex-
posure to cyber-attacks. Control systems are vulnerable to
cyber-threats, and successful attacks on them can cause se-
rious consequences[1−3]. Therefore, the security and safety
issues in controlled systems have been recently realized
and they are currently attracting considerable attention[4−20].
Some researchers focused on the cyber security of water
systems[3, 6−7]. Further works considered cyber-attacks on
smart grid systems[4, 8−10, 12]. In order to detect as well as
identify and isolate these cyber-attacks as early as possible,
different detection approaches were presented. For example
[13] investigated the problem of false data injection attacks
against state estimation in electric power grids[14] proposed
a model predictive approach for cyber-attack detection[15].
presented a stochastic cyber-attack detection scheme based
on frequency-domain transformation technique[16]. considered
robust H∞ cyber-attacks estimation for control systems[17].
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proposed a detection algorithm by investigating the fre-
quency spectrum distribution of the network traffic. References
[18−20] used consensus dynamics in networked multi-agent
systems including malicious agents. As far as we know, no
existing literatures deal with the problem of multiple cyber-
attacks. In practice, however, hackers might attempt to launch
multiple attacks aiming at multiple communication channels
of a control system in order to create attacks that are more
stealthy and thus more likely to succeed. When a hacker
launches two or more cyber-attacks against a control process,
usually it is claimed that the control system suffers from
multiple cyber-attacks. The fact that no research currently
deals with the detection of multiple cyber-attacks on a control
process motivates our research in detection of multiple cyber-
attacks.
This paper deals with the problem to detect multiple
stochastic cyber-attacks aiming at multiple communication
channels of a control system. We present an algebraic detection
approach based on the frequency-domain transformation. The
basic idea is to use appropriate observers to generate residual
information related to cyber-attacks. An anomaly detector for
the control system under multiple stochastic cyber-attacks and
stochastic disturbances is derived. The main contributions in
the paper are as follows. We first propose a control system
with multiple stochastic cyber-attacks that satisfy a Markovian
stochastic process. In addition, we also introduce the stochastic
attack models that are aiming at a specific controller command
input channel or sensor measurement output channel. Second,
based on the frequency-domain transformation technique and
auxiliary detection tools, the error dynamics of the control
system is transformed into algebraic equations. We consider
possible cyber-attacks as non-zero solutions of the algebraic
equations and the residuals as their constant vectors. By
analyzing the ranks of the stochastic system matrix and the
auxiliary stochastic system matrices, the residual information
caused by attacks from different communication channel is
obtained, respectively. Furthermore, based on the obtained
residual information, we are able to determine the detectability
of these cyber-attacks. The sufficient and necessary conditions
guaranteeing that these attacks are detectable or undetectable
are obtained. Finally, we provide two simulation examples to
illustrate the effectiveness of our results. In Example 1, we
consider a control system with stochastic noises. We detect
possible stochastic cyber-attacks, which are aiming at three
different controller command input channels on the actuator.
In Example 2, we use the quadruple-tank process (QTP) as
described in [21]. We also detect two possible cyber-attacks
on the QTP. These simulation results show that the proposed
attack detection approach is effective and feasible.
For convenience, we adopt the following notations: E{·} is
the mathematical expectation operator; dim(·) denotes the di-
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mension of given vector; L2z([0, ∞); Rn) is the space of
nonanticipative stochastic processes.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
Consider the following control system with multiple
stochastic cyber-attacks aiming at specific controller command
input channels and sensor measurement output channels.
x˙(t) = Ax(t) +B
(
u(t) +
n1∑
i=1
αi(t)fiaai (t)
)
+ E1w(t),
x(0) = x0,
y(t) = C
x(t) + n2∑
j=1
βj(t)hjasj(t)
+ E2v(t), (1)
where x(t) ∈ Rr is the state vector, u(t) ∈ Rm is the control
input, y(t) ∈ Rp is the measurement output, aai (t) ∈ R,
i = 1, . . . , n1 and asj(t) ∈ R, j = 1, . . . , n2 denote the
actuator cyber-attack aiming at the i-th controller command
input channel and the sensor cyber-attack aiming at the j-th
sensor measurement output channel, respectively. A, B, C,
E1 and E2 are known constant matrices. w(t) and v(t) are
stochastic noises (w(t), v(t) ∈ L2z([0,∞);Rn)). fi and hj
are the attacked coefficients. αi(t) and βi(t) are Markovian
stochastic processes with the binary state (0 or 1), which
satisfy the following probability
E{αi(t)} = Prob {αi(t) = 1} = ρi,
E{βj(t)} = Prob {βj(t) = 1} = σj ,
i = 1, . . . , n1 ≤ m, j = 1, . . . , n2 ≤ r. (2)
Herein, the event αi(t) = 1 (or βj(t) = 1) shows that the
i-th controller command input channel on the actuator (or
the j-th sensor measurement output channel on the sensor)
is subject to an actuator cyber-attack aai (t) (or a sensor cyber-
attack asj(t)); αi(t) = 0 (or βj(t) = 0) means no attack on the
i-th (or the j-th)channel. ρi ∈ [0, 1] (or σj ∈ [0, 1]) reflects
the occurrence probability of the event that the actuator (or
the sensor) of the system is subject to a cyber-attack aai (t) (or
asj(t)). αi(t) and βj(t) are independent from each other, they
are also independent from the stochastic noises w(t), v(t) and
the initial state x0.
The control input matrix B and the output state matrix C are
expressed as the following column vector groups, respectively
B =
[
b1 . . . bi . . . bm
]
,
C =
[
c1 . . . cj . . . cr
]
, (3)
where bi is the i-th column vector of matrix B and cj is the
j-th column vector of matrix C. And the control input u(t)
and the system state x(t) are written as
u(t) =

u1(t)
u2(t)
...
um(t)
 , x(t) =

x1(t)
x2(t)
...
xr(t)
 . (4)
A. Modeling a Stochastic Cyber-attacks on a Specified Com-
munication Channel
In order to increase the success chance of an attack and
to intrude more stealthily, hackers may attempt to launch
stochastic cyber-attacks aiming at one or several special com-
munication channels of a control system. In a stochastic data
denial-of-service (DoS) attack, the objective of hackers is to
prevent the actuator from receiving control commands or the
controller from receiving sensor measurements. Therefore, by
compromising devices and preventing them from sending data,
attacking the routing protocols, jamming the communication
channels, flooding the communication network with random
data and so on, hackers can launch a stochastic data DoS attack
that satisfies Markovian stochastic processes. In a stochastic
data deception attack, hackers attempt to prevent the actuator
or the sensor from receiving an integrity data by sending false
information u˜(t) 6= u(t) or y˜(t) 6= y(t) from controllers or
sensors. The false information includes: injection of a bias
data that cannot be detected in the system, or an incorrect
time of observing a measurement; a wrong sender identity,
an incorrect control input or an incorrect sensor measurement.
The hacker can launch these attacks by compromising some
controllers or sensors or by obtaining the secret keys.
In this work, we model stochastic data DoS attacks and
stochastic data deception attacks, which hackers possibly
launch on a control system aiming at a specific controller com-
mand input channel or sensor measurement output channel.
1) A stochastic DoS attack preventing the actuators from
receiving control command of the i-th control channel can be
modelled as
αi(t) ∈ {0, 1} , t ≥ t0, i = 1, . . . , n1 ≤ m,
fi =

0
...
1
...
0

m×1
, (5)
aai (t) = −ui(t).
2) A stochastic DoS attack preventing the sensors from
receiving sensor measure of the j-th output channel can be
modelled as
βj(t) ∈ {0, 1} , t ≥ t0, j = 1, . . . , n2 ≤ r,
hj =

0
...
1
...
0

r×1
, (6)
asj(t) = −xj .
Moreover, if the following conditions are satisfied:
m∑
i=1
αi(t)fiaai (t) = −u(t), (7)
and
r∑
j=1
βj(t)hjasj(t) = −x(t), (8)
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these stochastic attacks mentioned above completely deny the
services on the actuator and on the sensors, respectively.
3) A stochastic data deception attack preventing the actuator
from a correct control input of the i-th control channel can be
modelled as
αi(t) ∈ {0, 1} , t ≥ t0, i = 1, . . . , n1 ≤ m,
fi =

0
...
1
...
0

m×1
, (9)
aai (t) = −ui(t) + dai (t) or aai (t) = dai (t).
4) A stochastic data deception attack preventing the sensor
from a correct sensor measurement of the j-th output channel
can be modelled as
βj(t) ∈ {0, 1} , t ≥ t0, j = 1, . . . , n2 ≤ r,
hj =

0
...
1
...
0

r×1
, (10)
asj(t) = −xj + dsj(t) or asj(t) = dsj(t),
where dai (t) and d
s
j(t) are deceptive data that hackers attempt
to launch on the actuator and the sensor, respectively.
Now, let Tdai y(s) = C(sI − A)−1bi which is the transfer
function from the attack dai (t) to output measure y(t). When
hackers launch a data deception attack aai (t) = d
a
i (t) on the
actuator to make Tdai y(s) = 0, a zero dynamic attack occurs on
the actuator. Obviously, a zero dynamic attack is undetectable.
In addition, it is not possible for a hacker to launch a zero
dynamic attack on the sensor, since the transfer function from
the attack dsj(t) to output y(t) is Tdsjy(s) = cj 6= 0.
Remark 1. In the stochastic attack models (5)−(10), the
attacked coefficients fi and hj are column vectors. Herein
only the element in the i-th row is 1 and the rest elements
are 0 in fi, which implies that only the i-th control channel
of a control system is attacked. Similarly, only the element
in the j-th row is 1 and the rest elements are 0 in hj , which
implies that only the j-th output channel of a control system
is attacked.
Remark 2. To attack a target, hackers may launch multiple
attacks aiming at multiple communication channels so that the
aggression opportunities are increased and the attack target is
compromised, more stealthily and successfully. For example,
in order to effectively disturb the formation control of multi-
vehicle systems, a hacker could launch multiple stochastic
cyber-attacks, which are respectively aiming at different com-
munication links among these vehicles or aiming at multiple
controller command input channels of a single vehicle. Ob-
viously, the detection and isolation of multiple cyber-attacks
are very important in the formation control of multi-vehicle
systems. Therefore, the research on multiple cyber-attacks is
significant, and requires further research.
III. MAIN RESULTS
In this section, we present the approach to the anomaly de-
tection. We assume that the following conditions are satisfied:
1) the pair (A,B) is controllable; 2) (A,C) is observable.
For simplification of the discussion, we ignore the influence
of control inputs in the remainder of this paper because they
do not affect the residual when there are no modeling errors
in the system transfer matrix. Therefore, system (1) can be
rewritten as follows:
x˙(t) = Ax(t) +
n1∑
i=1
αi(t)Bfiaai (t) + E1w(t),
x(0) = x0,
y(t) = Cx(t) +
n2∑
j=1
βj(t)Chjasj(t) + E2v(t). (11)
We set up the following anomaly detector:
˙˜x(t) = Ax˜(t) + B˜r(t),
x˜(0) = 0,
r(t) = y(t)− Cx˜(t), (12)
where B˜ is the detector gain matrix and r(t) represents the
output residual.
Let e(t) = x(t)− x˜(t), then we obtain the following error
dynamics:
e˙(t) = Ae(t) +
n∑
i=1
F iai(t) + E1d(t),
r(t) = Ce(t) +
n∑
i=1
Hiai(t) + E2d(t), (13)
with the matrices
A = (A− B˜C),
Hi =
[
0 βi(t)Chi,
]
,
F i =
[
αi(t)Bfi −βi(t)B˜Chi,
]
,
E1 =
[
E1 −B˜E2
]
,
E2 =
[
0 E2
]
, (14)
and the vectors
ai(t) =
[
aai (t)
asi (t)
]
, d(t) =
[
w(t)
v(t)
]
,
where cyber-attacks aai (t), a
s
i (t), i = 1, . . . , n and the vectors
describing the attacked coefficients fi, hi, i = 1, . . . , n satisfy
the following conditions
n ≤ max{n1, n2},{
aan1+1(t) = a
a
n1+2(t) = · · · = aan(t) = 0, n = n2 > n1,
asn2+1(t) = a
s
n2+2(t) = · · · = asn(t) = 0, n = n1 > n2,
and {
fn1+1 = fn1+2 = · · · = fn = 0, n = n2 > n1,
hn2+1 = hn2+2 = · · · = hn = 0, n = n1 > n2.
Before presenting the main results, we give the following
definition and lemma.
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Definition 1. For anomaly detector error dynamics, if a
cyber-attack on a control system leads to zero output residual,
then the cyber-attack is undetectable.
If Tdr(s) = C(sI − A)−1E1 + E2 denotes the transfer
function from stochastic disturbance d(t) to output residual
r(t), the robust stability condition of error dynamic (13) is
given in term of the following lemma.
Lemma 1[16]. When all stochastic events αi(t) = βi(t) = 0
(i = 1, . . . , n), there are the following conclusions:
1) The error dynamics (13) without disturbances is asymp-
totically stable, if there exists a symmetric positive definite
matrix P > 0 and a matrix X such that the following linear
matrix inequality (LMI) holds
Ψ = ATP + PA− CTXT −XC + CTC < 0. (15)
2) The error dynamics (13) with disturbances d(t) (0 6= d(t)
∈ L2z([0,∞);Rn)) is robustly stable, if ‖Tdr(s)‖∞ < 1 and
if there exists a symmetric positive definite matrix P > 0 and
a matrix X such that the following LMI holds Ψ PE1 −XE2 + CTE2∗ −I 0
∗ ∗ −I + ET2 E2
 < 0. (16)
When the LMIs above are solvable, the detector gain matrix
is given by B˜ = P−1X.
A. Algebraic Detection Scheme for Multiple Stochastic Cyber-
attacks Aiming at Multiple Communication Channels
In this section, using the frequency-domain description of
the system, we transform the error dynamics (13) into the
following equation:
Q(s)X(s) = B(s), (17)
where
Q(s) =
[
A− sI F 1 . . . Fn E1
C H1 . . . Hn E2
]
,
X(s) =

e(s)
a1(s)
...
an(s)
d(s)
 , B(s) =
(
0
r(s)
)
.
Further, in order to obtain effective results, we introduce the
mathematical expectation of the stochastic matrix Q(s) as
follows:
E(Q(s)) =
[
A− sI E(F 1) . . . E(Fn) E1
C E(H1) . . . E(Hn) E2
]
, (18)
where
E(F i) =
[
ρiBfi −σiB˜Chi
]
,
E(Hi) =
[
0 σiChi
]
, i = 1, . . . , n.
Then the system (17) can be described as
E(Q(s))X(s) = B(s), (19)
and the equation (19) can be rewritten as
E(Q(s))X(s) =
n∑
i=1
E(Q˜i(s))Xi(s) =
n∑
i=1
Bi(s),
where
E(Q˜i(s)) =

A− sI
n
E(F i)
E1
n
C
n
E(Hi)
E2
n
 ,
Xi(s) =
 e(s)ai(s)
d(s)
 ,
Bi(s) =
(
0
ri(s)
)
,
r(s) =
n∑
i=1
ri(s).
Consider the following stochastic matrix:
E(Qi(s)) =
[
A− sI E(F i) E1
C E(Hi) E2
]
.
Since rankE(Q˜i(s)) = rankE(Qi(s)), we introduce the
following auxiliary error dynamics
e˙(t) = Ae(t) + F iai(t) + E1d(t),
r(t) = Ce(t) +Hiai(t) + E2d(t),
i = 1, . . . , n, (20)
and the auxiliary stochastic equations
E(Qi(s))Xi = Bi(s), i = 1, . . . , n. (21)
Remark 3. Here, since the matrices F i and Hi include
the stochastic parameters αi(t) and βi(t), the system matrix
Q(s) correspondingly includes these stochastic parameters,
and E(Q(s)) and E(Qi(s)) include stochastic probabilities ρi
and σi as well, which take values in [0, 1]. Therefore, they are
stochastic matrices.
Remark 4. In this work, we introduce the auxiliary math-
ematical “tools” (20) and (21). The auxiliary error dynamics
(20) represents the fact that the control system is only sub-
jected to a stochastic cyber-attack ai(t) on the i-th communi-
cation channel. Applying the auxiliary equation (21), we can
obtain the information of residual ri(t) that is caused by the
cyber-attack ai(t). In addition, the detector gain matrix B˜ can
be determined according to Lemma 1.
Now, applying the rank of the stochastic matrix, we obtain
the following theorem.
Theorem 1. For system (11), we assume that all of these
stochastic matrices E(Q(s)) and E(Qi(s)) (i = 1, . . . , n)
have full column normal rank. All of these cyber-attacks
ai(s) (i = 1, . . . , n, (0 6= ai(s) ∈ G)) when s = z0 are
undetectable, if and only if there exists z0 ∈ , such that
rankE(Q(z0)) < dim(X(z0)), (22)
and
rankE(Qi(z0)) < dim(Xi(z0)), i = 1, . . . , n. (23)
Herein G is a set of undetectable cyber-attacks.
Proof. (If) Assume that there exists z0 ∈ C such that condi-
tions (22) and (23) hold for all ai(z0) ∈ G, it becomes obvious
that z0 is an invariant zero[22] of the detector error system (13)
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and the auxiliary system (20). Then all of the equations in (19)
and (20) are homogeneous, i.e., B(z0) = 0 and Bi(z0) = 0.
Therefore, the output residual ri(z0) = 0, i = 1, . . . , n, and
r(z0) =
∑n
i=1 ri(z0) = 0 as well. By Definition 1, all of these
cyber-attacks ai(s), i . . . , n when s = z0 are undetectable.
(Only if) Assume that all of these cyber-attacks ai(s), i
= 1, . . . , n when s = z0 are undetectable, then there must
exist a z0 ∈ C such that the residual ri(z0) = 0 and r(z0)
=
∑n
i=1 ri(z0) = 0. Therefore, all of the equations in (19)
and (21) are homogeneous. If we assume that all of matrices
E(Q(z0)) and E(Qi(z0)) have full column rank, then all of
these homogeneous equations have and only have one zero
solution. However, this contradicts with the conditions that
X |s=z0 6= 0, Xi |s=z0 6= 0, i = 1, . . . , n
are solutions to (19) and (21), respectively. Therefore the
assumptions are false, only conditions (22) and (23) are true.
¤
Theorem 2. For system (11), we assume that all of stochas-
tic matrices E(Q(s)) and E(Qi(s)) (i = 1, . . . , n) have full
column normal rank. All of these cyber-attacks ai(s) (i = 1,
. . ., n, (0 6= ai(s) ∈ G)) are detectable, if and only if the
following conditions always hold for any z0 ∈ C:
rankE(Q(z0)) = dim(X(z0)), (24)
and
rankE(Qi(z0)) = dim(Xi(z0)), i = 1, . . . , n. (25)
Herein G is a set of detectable cyber-attacks.
Proof. (If) Assuming that conditions (24) and (25) always
hold for any z0 ∈ C, it is obvious that the stochastic matrices
E(Q(z0)) and E(Qi(z0)) (i = 1, . . . , n) have full column
rank. Then the equation
E(Q(z0))X(z0) = B(z0), (26)
and the auxiliary stochastic equations
E(Qi(z0))Xi = Bi(z0), i = 1, · · · , n (27)
have one and only one solution. In the following, we proof by
contradiction. Assume that residual r(z0) = 0 and ri(z0) = 0,
i = 1, . . . , n, then equations (26) and (27) has one and only
one zero solution, i.e.,
X |s=z0 = 0, Xi |s=z0 = 0, i = 1, . . . , n.
However, this violates the given condition 0 6= ai(z0) ∈ G,
i.e.,
X |s=z0 6= 0, Xi |s=z0 6= 0, i = 1, . . . , n.
Therefore r(z0) 6= 0 and ri(z0) 6= 0, i = 1, . . . , n, these
cyber-attacks ai(s) (0 6= ai(s) ∈ G), i = 1, . . . , n, for any s
= z0 are detectable.
(Only if) Assume that there exists a z0 ∈ C which satisfies
conditions (22) and (23). Since all of the stochastic matrices
E(Q(s)) and E(Qi(s)) (i = 1, . . . , n) have full column ranks,
according to Theorem 1, these cyber-attacks ai(s), i = 1, . . . ,
n are undetectable as s = z0. However, this is in contradiction
with the given condition that all of these cyber-attacks ai(s),
i = 1, . . . , n are detectable for any s = z0. Therefore the
assumption is false, only
rankE(Q(z0)) = dim(X(z0)),
and
rankE(Qi(z0)) = dim(Xi(z0)), i = 1, . . . , n
are true. ¤
Furthermore, we can obtain the following corollary accord-
ing to Theorem 1 and Theorem 2.
Corollary 1. For system (11), assume that all of stochastic
matrices E(Q(s)) and E(Qi(s)) (i = 1, . . . , n) have full
column normal rank. If there exists z0 ∈ C, such that
rankE(Q(z0)) < dim(X(z0)), (28)
then there are the following conclusions.
1) The cyber-attack ai(z0) (0 6= ai(s) ∈ G) is detectable,
if and only if
rankE(Qi(z0)) = dim(Xi(z0)). (29)
2) The cyber-attack aj(z0) (0 6= aj(s) ∈ G) is undetectable,
if and only if
rankE(Qj(z0)) < dim(Xj(z0)). (30)
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we provide two simulation examples to
illustrate the effectiveness of our results. In Example 1, we
consider a control system under three stochastic cyber-attacks
and a stochastic noise. We detect two possible stochastic data
DoS attacks and a possible stochastic data deception attack,
which are aiming at three controller command input channels
on the actuator. In Example 2, we use the laboratory process
as presented in [21], which consists of four interconnected
water tanks. We will also detect possible cyber-attacks on QTP
controlled through a wireless communication network.
Example 1. Consider the following system with a stochastic
noise w(t)
x˙(t) = Ax(t) +Bu(t) + E1w(t),
x(0) = x0, (31)
y(t) = Cx(t),
and with the following parameters:
A =

−0.8 0 0.1 0 0
0 −0.2 0 −0.1 0
0 0 −0.4 0 0
0 0 0 −0.3 0
0.2 0 0.1 0 −0.5
 ,
B =

0.03 0 0.3
0 0.04 0
0 −0.08 0.45
−0.21 0 0.1
0.09 0 0
 ,
E1 =

0.09
−0.01
0.04
−0.07
0.06
 , C =
 0.5 0 0 0 00 0.5 0 0 00 0 0.5 0 0
0 0 0 0.5 0
 .
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Assume that it is subjected to two stochastic data DoS attacks
and a stochastic data deception attack on the actuator aiming
at three controller command input channels, i.e.,
α1(t) ∈ {0, 1} , t ≥ t0,
f1 =
 10
0
 , (32)
aa1(t) = −u1(t),
and
α2(t) ∈ {0, 1} , t ≥ t0,
f2 =
 01
0
 , (33)
aa2(t) = −u2(t) + ba2(t),
and
α3(t) ∈ {0, 1} , t ≥ t0,
f3 =
 00
1
 , (34)
aa3(t) = −u3(t).
As mentioned before, we ignore the control input, since it does
not affect the residual.
By applying Lemma 1, the robust detector gain matrix can
be obtained as follows:
B˜ =

0.6316 0 0.0826 0
0 2.7474 0 −0.6078
0.0961 0 1.2444 0
0 −0.6325 0 1.7707
0.0251 0 0.0304 0
 .
Set the initial conditions as x˜(0) = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0]T and x(0)
= [−0.2, 0.4, 0.8,−1, 0.1]T. When the stochastic events α1(t)
= α2(t) = α3(t) = 0 occur, the system is not under
any cyber-attacks. Fig. 1 displays the time responses of the
residual and the system state under stochastic noise w(t) only,
which shows that the system is robustly stable. When the
stochastic events α1(t) = α2(t) = α3(t) = 1 occur, the
system is under multiple cyber-attacks. We take the attack
probabilities ρ1 = ρ2 = 0.8 and ρ3 = 0.5, the stochastic
matrix rank(E(Q(s))) = 9, and rank(E(Q(z0))) = 9,
rank(E(Qi(z0))) = 7 (i = 1, 2, 3), which shows that
rank(E(Q(z0))), rank(E(Qi(z0))) (i = 1, 2, 3) have always
full column rank for any z0. According to Theorem 2, the
three attacks are detectable. Fig. 2 displays the noise signal
and the attack signals, while Fig. 3 shows the time responses
of the residual and the system state under three attacks and
noise. Fig. 4, Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 give the time responses of the
residual under the attack aa1(t), a
a
2(t) and a
a
3(t), respectively.
Simultaneously, they show the corresponding attack signals.
The simulation results underline that these cyber-attacks can
be effectively detected if the conditions in Theorem 2 are
satisfied.
Example 2. Consider the model of the QTP in [21].
x˙ = Ax+Bu, (35)
y = Cx,
Fig. 1. The time responses of the residual and the system state under
the noise.
Fig. 2. The noise signal and the attack signals.
with the following parameters:
A =
 −0.0158 0 0.0256 00 −0.0109 0 0.01780 0 −0.0256 0
0 0 0 −0.0178
 ,
C =
[
0.5 0 0 0
0 0.5 0 0
]
,
B =
 0.0482 00 0.03500 0.0775
0.0559 0
 .
Assume that it is subjected to two stochastic data deception
attacks on the actuator, i.e.,
α1(t) ∈ {0, 1} , t ≥ t0,
f1 =
[
1
0
]
, (36)
aa1(t) = b
a
1(t),
and
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Fig. 3. The time responses of the residual and the system state under
three attacks and noise.
Fig. 4. The time responses of the residual under attack aa1(t) and
the attack signal aa1(t).
Fig. 5. The time responses of the residual under attack aa2(t) and
the attack signal aa2(t).
Fig. 6. The time responses of the residual under attack aa3(t) and
the attack signal aa3(t).
Fig. 7. The time responses of the residual and the system state
without attacks.
α2(t) ∈ {0, 1} , t ≥ t0,
f2 =
[
0
1
]
, (37)
aa2(t) = b
a
2(t).
The detector gain matrix can be obtained as follows:
B˜ =
 0.7852 00 0.47662.7432 0
0 1.4367
 ,
We set the initial conditions as x˜(0) = [0, 0, 0, 0]T and x(0)
= [0.1,−0.4,−0.1, 0.5]T. When the stochastic events α1(t)
= α2(t) = 0 occur, Fig. 7 visualizes that the system (35)
is asymptotically stable. When the stochastic events α1(t) =
α2(t) = 1 occur and the attack probabilities are ρ1 = 0.8, ρ2 =
0.5, we have stochastic matrix rank(E(Q(s))) = 6, however,
there exists a z0 = 0.0127 such that rank(E(Q(z0))) = 5 and
rank(E(Qi(z0))) = 5 (i = 1, 2). Aiming at two different con-
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trol channels, it is possible for the hacker to launch two
stochastic data deception attacks as follows:
ba1(t) = −1.074e0.0127t,
ba2(t) = e
0.0127t,
such that the transfer function from attacks to residual is zero.
Therefore, it is difficult to detect these stealthy attacks. Fig. 8
displays the time responses of the residual and the system
state under the two attacks aa1(t) and a
a
2(t), which shows that
these attacks when s = z0 = 0.0127 could not be detected by
original model. However, applying the auxiliary tools (20),
(21) and according to Corollary 1, these attacks can also
be detected. Fig. 9 displays the attack signal aa1(t) and the
responses of the residual under this attack. Fig. 10 shows the
attack signal aa2(t) and the responses of residual under this
attack. Obviously, applying Corollary 1, the two stochastic
data deception attacks can be detected effectively.
Fig. 8. The time responses of the residual and the system state under
attacks aa1(t) and aa2(t).
Fig. 9. The time responses of residual under the attack aa1(t) and
the attack signal aa1(t).
V. CONCLUSION
This paper presents a cyber-attack detection approach for
control systems under multiple stochastic cyber-attacks and
disturbances. The proposed problem is significant in practice,
Fig. 10. The time responses of residual under the attack aa2(t) and
the attack signal aa2(t).
because hackers might launch multiple attacks aiming at one
target so that the aggression opportunities are increased and
the attack target can be compromised, more stealthily and
successfully. For example, the hacker is able to simultaneously
launch DoS attacks, deception attacks and replay attacks that
are respectively aiming at different communication channels
of a control system. The main work here is focused on novel
cyber-attack detection schemes that allow the detection of
multiple stochastic attacks in order to protect control systems
against a wide range of possible attack models. We give two
simulation examples the results of which demonstrate that the
detection approaches proposed in this paper are feasible and
effective.
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